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THE SEPA"I'7% USTATI OF MARRIED WOMEN
THE SEPARATE EQUITABLE ESTATE OF MARRIED
WOMEN.
As said by Bishop, "Since the cowfusion of tongues at the
Tower of Babel there has been nothing more noteworthy, in
the same line, than the discordant and evershifting utter-
ances of the judicial mind on the subject of the present sub-
title. True, there has been sometimes a language which,
though limited in its sphere, was tolerably plain; but no
sooner was the language in the way of being understoodi than,
1o, some conquering power of another sort came in, and all
was confusion once more. Let us see, however, if we cannot
draw out from the mass of discordant sound something which
shall call to mind the heaven which ought to be, resting over
the hell which is." (Bishop, M. W., Vol. I, p. 847).
At common law the personality of the wife became merged
into that of her husband.' She had no separate legal existence
aind consequently no power or right to hold and acquire
property. By marriage the personalty of the wife became
the husband's absolutely; and such choses in action as he
reduced to possession. Of her realty he became the owner
for all practical purposes, as he was entitled to all the rents
and profits. She could not acquire any property without his
consent, and if she so became able to do that, the property
immediately became his by virtue of the marital rights.
And the reason attributed to such rights is of natural
origin. By nature we find man the stronger and it thus
befell to him to provide for the wife who became incapacitated
by maternal duties. The husband gave support and protec-
tion to the family, and naturally as the acquisition of property
was the most effective 15 that end, the law placed in him the
1. 1 Blackstone Comm., 442; 2 Kent Comm., 129; Coke Ltt., 112b; 1
Bishop M. W., sec. 35.
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personalty of the wife; for necessarily the world at large
could not divide any interest that property might caase
between husband and wife. For that would occasion danger
to the family unity THE LAW BASED ON SUCH REA-
SON HAS COMPELLED ALL the world to deal with hus-
band and wife as one. So, by virtue of marriage the property
of the wife became the husband's. Further, in consideration
of the obligations that were incident to marriage the husband
became bound to pay all the debts that were pending against
the wife at the time of marriage, also bound to support her
and maintain the children in the proper manner 2
While this was the doctrine that gave the best results to
the protection and preservation of the family, still it was not
entirely without defects. The husband could sell and dispose
of the rights to the property which he had received from the
wife, and so invest or squander it to the detriment of the
family. Or he might become insolvent and the property thus
acquired for the benefit of the family would be taken by.
creditors of the husband; and the wife 'as without protec-
tion, for the machinery of the law could not furnish any
remedy under such circumstances.
Then Equity, at a very early date,8 meeting and reasoning
for the best intent of the law, established the wife's Equitv
of Settlement, a doctrine based on the maxim. "he who seeks
equity must do equity." That is, when the husband sought
to enforce his marital rights in regard to the wife's property,.
or creditors seeking to enforce their claims on such property,
a court of equity required a reasonable setth'ment out of such
property in favor of the wife and children.'
But courts of equity made another important step in favor
of the wife and created her separate Equitable Estate, a
2. 10 Ve'.. 90; 8 Ves., 2.6 :5 MyL & er., 103.
3. 6 M&C., 377.
4. 2 Kent Comm., 139.
254
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol7/iss4/6
'THE SEPA, JTRTATZ OF MARRIED WOMEN
property created for her sole and separate use; so settled upon
.her that courts of equity recognize it during her coverture
as her own, unaffected by the marital rights of the husband.5
And as stated by Lord Cottenham in the leading case of
Tullett v. Armstrong," "when courts established the sepa-
rated estate it violated the laws of property as between hus-
band and wife, but it was thought beneficial, so it prevailed."
And the reason given, that such was a violation, is based on
the idea that it was an infringement of the marital rights of
the husband to have a stranger confer property upon the wife.
independent of the husband, over which he had no power and
could asaert no interest. But equity met this reasoning with
the argument that an absolute owner of property might
convey it to whom he pleases, vnd on such, terms as the law
would permit. As the husband had no right in the property,
"it does not deprive him of any right not to confer any upon
hdm. 7 But after such estate was created and sanctioned by
the courts of equity the laws of property became attached
thereto, and the power of alienation was the next to defeat the
purpose for which the estate was created; for now the wife
under the moral influence of the husband, gave to him what
the courts were trying to keep from him. And this is brought
out clearly in Tullett v. Armstrong, supra, the Court said:
"The estate for separate use as sanctioned by courts of
equity has its peculiar existence only in the married state.
It was to operate as a protection to married women. But the
power of alienation remaining with the wife the separate
estate unfettered is no protection against the moral influence
of the husband, and many instances have occurred, and daily
occur in which the wife, under the persuasion of influence of
her husband, has been induced to exercise her power of
alienation in his favor or for his benefit and thus defeat the
5. 1 Bro. C. C.. 20; 4 Dro. C. C., 485; 9 Ves., 189; 3 Mad., 388.
8. 4 Myl. & C.. 377.
7. 4 MU1. & C., 390.
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purpose intended for her." So equity, again using its extraor-
dinary power, held that as the estate was a creature uo
equity that same power might modify it to meet the ends for
which it was intended, and accordingly gave validity to a
clause restraining the power of alienation.i
It was first held that restraints upon alienation when mar-
ried women were given the equitable ownership of property
were void the same as in case of legal estates.9 For at common
law every person sui juris that held interest in property had
the power of alienation,-jus disponendi. And equity hitherto
had not questioned that power.10 And a married woman
was considered as swsi juris in regard to her separate estate
and had full power of alienation, until Lord Thurlow in Pybui.
v. Smith," expressed such reluctance in rendering a decision
in favor of creditors of the husband, holding the separate
estate of the wife liable on a bond in which she had joined
her husband. As said by Lord Eldon, in Parks v. White,"z
"Lord Thurlow made the decision in Pybus v. Smith, supra,
with great reluctance, thinking the act proposed unright-
Cous.,,
Thus, as stated by Professor Gray, in his "Restraints and
Alienation," page 125: "When in the interest of married
women the doctrine of separate use and restraint upon
anticipation came into existence, the interests of alienation
of which it sought to restrain were life interests. It was
only in Baggett v. Meux (1844)12 that the question as to the
validity of a clause against anticipation upon a gift of an
absolute interest came up. In this case the legal estate in land
was devised to a married woman in fee for her separate use,
8. 3 Bro. C. C., 340; 2 Russ. and M., 197; 18 Ves., 429; 2 Meru, 487.
9. 1 Beau., 1; Jac., 606.
I0. 1 Yes. Jr.. 48; 3 Bro. C. C., 9.
11. 3 Bro. C. C., 340.
12. 11 Ves. Jr.. 222.
13. 1 Colly Ch. C., 138.
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with a direction that she should not sell or encumber it. She did
encumnber it. Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce held that a
restraint on anticipation was equally valid upon a fee simple
as upon a life estate, and that the encumbrance was void.
This decision was confirmed by Lord Lyndhurst in Baggett
v. Meux."4
But the law looked with an evil eye upon all restraints in
a grant of a fee, for it is the very purpose and essence of that
estate that the control be entire, and therefore repugnant
to the grant. It was only after a long line of decisions 5 that
it became firmly established, that the exception to the in-
validity of restraints upon alienation of a fee, or absolute
interests, in the case of married woman's separate estate
was valid. And when it thus became firmly fixed as a bound
doctrine courts even desired to take it further, and it was
even intimated in re Riddley"6 that the rule against perpetui-
ties should be held not to apply to restrain' - on alienation
by married women, though the decision wa' the other way
on authority.
So v-as the extraordinary power of eouity exercised in bold
defiance to common law doctrines. In brief, we have followed
the evolution of the married woman's equitable interests-
wifn'q e',nitv of settlement, wife's separate equitable estate,
and the necessary steps for her control over that. It now
rema;n to be seen what the law will do in case no Provision
of res+raint is made. an-1 what eciuitv will uphold when Sncli
provi-;ori i- inse-ted in the instrument of conveyance. In
the first inqtanee the laws of property affect the estate of
married women as they do any estate of a sui iuris. and her
power of alinafion is bhsolute. In the second we have the
annlie'tion of the exception to the cardinal principle of the
14. 1 Phill. Ch., 627.
15. 3 Ves. Jr.. 488; 8 Ves., 175; 4 Bro. C. C., 483; 15 Ves., 596; 9 Ves..
497.
16. 11 Ch. D., 645.
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common law (that gives absolute power with absolute inter-
eat), giving validity to a clause against alienation. Generally,
the doctrine is held that a married woman is conaLderea in
equity a feme sole with respect to her separate property, anti
onsequently has absolute dominion and power oi alienation
unless restrained by the instrument by wich she becamn en-
titled to it.'7 And the rule, that where a specific mode of dispo-
sition is made, that she is not limited to that mode of disposing
or alienating it, is also sustained generally in England."' The
maxim, "expressio unius exclusio alterius," n.ust yield.
.Accordingly to these cases, as the natural inmerece that an
un 1ualified gift carries with it unqualified rights of disposi-
tion.
But the doctrines as stated above have not been entirely
followed in England. Some courts holding that a right of
disposition, as specifically designated in the instrument,
excawhs all other modes oi disposition.' 9 The English judges
deciding these cases admitted that tle weight of authority is
opposed to such restraint, but regretted that the law had
become so settled. In Sockett v. Wray20 a very distinct case
on the point the rule as to a specified mode of disposition was
uph,.id. Money was placed in trust for a married woman
to pay her interest for life to her separate use, after her
decease, to such persons as she should by any instrument in
writing from time to time or by will appoint (during her
present coverture) she cannot dispose of the principal at
it by deed. The court held that ".the omission of the words
once, by deed, but by revocable act only. She did dispose of
deed or deeds which are usually inserted in such powers is a
strong guard and shows she was only to do it by a revocable
act, and has no right to give but under that power." How-
17. 3 John Ch., 77.
18. 11 Ves.. 222; 1 Sim & St., 429; 1 Ves. Jr., 189: 3 Bro. C. C., 565.
19. 3 Atk., 541: 4 Bro. C. C., 541; 3 Ves., 437; 14 Ves., 542.
20. 4 Bro. C. C., 486.
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ever, today, the dootrine that a married woman has full
power over her separate estate unless restrained by the
instrument is the prevailing one in England. 1 And we shall
niow consider the United States. There have been many
contradictory decisions. The first court to uphold the doc-
trine that a feme covert limited to that mode of alienation or
power cver as given to her in the instrument is the case of
k'wing v. Smith2 2 from the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
In that case a trust estate was settled upon a wife to her
.eparate use with the power to. dispose by will only. The
court was divided three to five, the majority opinion holding
that a married woman was restricted to that particular mode
,i disposition as stated in the instrument. Chancellor Dessau-
.-ure very elaborately reviewed the English authorities show-
ing the well settled doctrine in England. But the Chancellor
wvriting the majority opinion arguing against the English
authority said: "Never before the revolution, no more than
since was this court ever bound to servile adherence to prec-
(dlents of the English Court. This court ought to be inde-
pendent of every other in the exercise of its judgment * * *
It is indeed true as a general rule that an absolute right of
property gives an absolute right of disposition. But this rule
is applicable only to persons of full legal capacity; and it is
so strange that any English judge should have ever lost
sight of the common law so far as to apply it to married
women." And what the able court has said may be further
elucidated by Professor Gray's words in his "Restraints and
Alienation," page 269, "That doctrine of repugnancy of
restraints upon alienation is that it is against public policy
to permit restraints to be put on transfers, which the law
allows. But the common law does not allow married women
to transfer their property. The separate estate which allows
a transfer is the creature of equity, and it cannot be deemed
21. 86 L 3. Ch.. 217 (1917); 1 Chan., 30.
22. 3 Desau. 417.
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against public policy for equity to permit its creation to be
moulded by the clause against anticipation, ior the tendency
of such clause is only to put the married woman where the
common law always puts her." And this doctrine as laid
down in Ewing v. Smith, supra, has been followed. generally
in the United States.2 3 The courts of the United States have
not only agreed with the English that a married woman is
regarded as a feme sole as to her separate equitable estate,
unless restricted by the instrument, and that, if one mode
of alienation is designated, she can only act under that power,
but have taken a step further; holding, that she has no power
excepting that which is given by the instrument creating the
estate; that is, if no mention is made of any mode of aliena-
tion she has none whatsoever.2 ' The very often quoted and
much criticised decision of Chancellor Kent in M. R_. Church
v. Jaques"5 (1817) has taken the lead in justifying the doe-
trine that a feme covert ought only be deemed a feme sole sub
modo, or only to the extent given her by the instrument, on
the ground that the decisions were so floating and contradic-
tory that the court was free to adopt whatever the discretion
of the court may think best. He said: "The English decisions
are so floating and contradictory as to leave us the liberty
of adopting the true principle of these settlemencs. Instead
of maintaining that she has absolute power of disposition
unless restrained by the instrument, the converse of the
proposition would be more correct, "that she has no power
but what is specially given and to be exercised only in the
mode prescribed, if any such there be." The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Lancaster v. Dolan, held: "In fine, not-
withstanding the case of Newman v. Newman, which was
hastily determined, on an exception to the evidence, we are
23. 1 Bart. Pa., 111; 4 Yerg. Tenn., 375; 26 Miss., 276; 8 Leigh (Va.).
20: 5 Md., 219; 4 N. Y. Eq.. 512.
24. 84 N. C., 661; 1 Rawle (Penn.), 231; 2 R. I., 355; 1 Strobh. (S. C.)
Eq., 27; 83 Fed.. 19.
25. 3 John., 77.
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entirely prepared to adopt the conclusior, of Chancellor Kent
in M. E. Church v. Jaques, supra: That dhe English author-
ities are so floating and contradictory as to leave us at liberty
to adopt the true principle of these settlemezts. That instead
of holding the wife to be a feme sole to all intents as regards
her separate estate, she ought to be deemed so only to the
extent of power clearly given by the conveyance. That she
has no power but what is absolutely given." And, there are
many other States upholding this doctrine," the United
States Supreme Court included."
We may observe that M. E. Church v. Jaques, supra, after
being followed in many courts, was reversed in 17 John. 548,
and the doctrine of full power, when no mention is made of
;lienation, established: The court said, "trustees were intro-
luced merely to avoid the common law; not to become
Champions of the wife against the husband. Suppose a wife,
by her husband's influence, should choose to forego her
settlement, the worst that could happen to her would be, that
,die would be in that situation which the common law would
have originally placed her, and which is most consistent with
t1le natural state, and the true policy of society. Connubial
happiness is nowhere greater than in those countries where
the wife relies on the affection of her husband for protection
and support." And the idea of secret influence is rebutted
by the argument, that when a secret influence is exercised she
has the same right to seek remedy as any person sui juris?
The court says: "A Court of Chancery protects and relieves
every person from the effects of fraud, duress or undue in-
fluence; and where either is proved it will undoubtedly pro-
tect and relieve a wife, who may be more subject to it than
persons in other relations of life, and whose interests, there-
fore, are to be more vigilantly and jealously watched than
those of others." Then the three existing doctrines may be
stated. (1) Full power if not restrained by the instrument,28
26. 5 Tex.. 169; 12 G., 200.
27. 2 Pet. R., 595; 83 Fed., 19.
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(2) Confined to the particular mode of alienation given in
the instrument,29 (3) No power whatsoever but that s.ecinlly
given by the instrument.' 0 Not only have these doctrine.
varied among the different States, but courts of the same
States have varied in the application of the rules.31 However,
the prevailing doctrines in the United States are number one
and two,' 2 and these are the rules in Missouri.3
Which rule makes toward the greatest social and economic
good, might be answered thusly: The status of married
women is rapidly undergoing changes, and while it is held
generally, that the enabling acts of married women do not
affect her separate equitable estate,' 4 yet they do have the
effect of giving her a certain independence and protectiro,
and to dispense with -restrictions made -for her protection in
these settlements. Some courts hold that the modern enab-
ling acts of married women removing the disabilities of the
common law to contract and extending their rights over th.,ir
property, have removed the necessity of the doctrine against
alienation in regard to her separate equitable estate. On
the whole we may fairly deduct that the tendency of our
civilization with its progress is toward free alienation of
property and property rights, and that ultimately no re-
straints will be allowed. And this is in harmony with a cardi-
nal principle of the common law, that "alienation is an in-
separable attribute of property rights."
MCCALEB, '24
28. 17 Ga.. 612; 20 Conn.. 146; 32 Ga.. 604; 23 Ill.. 209; 13 Md., 348;
46 Mo., 532; 47 Mis., 569; 4 N. Y. Eq., 632; 13 W. V., 572.
29. See note 28.
30. 84 N. C., 661; 1 Rawle, 23; 2 R. ., 365; 1 Strobh. Eq., 27 (N. C.);
83 Fed., 19.
31. 12 W. V.. 587, overruled In 13 W. V., 572; 3 John., 77; reversed in
17 John.. 548 N. Y.; 88 Mo., 229, overruled In 96 Mo.. 22.
32. 23 Mo., 467; 68 Mo., 56; 32 Mo., 262; 69 Mo..' 684; 46 Mo., 532; 96
Ma.. 22.
33. 13 R. C. L, Hus. & Wife, sec. 156; 65 Mo. App., 117; 36 N. Y., 600;
75 II.. 446.
34. 39 L. R. A., 806; 133 Maim., 176; 65 Me., 254; 87 Md., 161.
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